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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD D. COLEY, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
vs. 
NANCY P. COLEY, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
Case No. 910419 
Case No. 900446-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION 
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION 
AND OPINION DATED AUGUST 15, 1991 
COMES NOW Defendant and Respondent, by and through counsel, 
and responds to Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari as 
follows. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Defendant instituted this action by 
filing a "Verified Motion for Order to Show Cause" against 
Plaintiff on or about February 21, 1990 (Record at 213). In the 
"Verified Motion" Defendant alleged: 
a) That numerous judgments had been entered against 
Plaintiff for failure to pay child support. (Record at 
213). 
b) That Plaintiff had been held in contempt of court 
and had served 30 days in the Salt Lake County Jail for 
his contempt. (Record at 214). 
c) That Plaintiff still demanded his visitation rights 
with the parties' minor daughter after his release from 
jail. (Record at 214). 
d) That the trial court should again sentence Plaintiff 
to serve time in the Salt Lake County Jail for his 
continued failure to pay child support and his continued 
contempt of court. (Record at 214). 
e) That the trial court should suspend Plaintiff's 
visitation rights with the parties' minor daughter for 
his continued contempt of court. (Record at 214). 
Disposition in the Lower Court. A hearing was held on 
Defendant's Order to Show Cause on June 18, 1990 in the Third 
District Court. Evidence was proffered by counsel for Defendant 
and Plaintiff was called to testify. Judge James S. Sawaya found 
that Plaintiff was in contempt and ordered Plaintiff's visitation 
terminated until further order of the court and sentenced Plaintiff 
to serve thirty (30) days in the Salt Lake County Jail, however, 
the jail sentence was suspended. (Record at 262). An Order was 
signed by Judge Sawaya on July 13, 1990, (Record 268-271), and an 
Amended Order was entered by Judge Sawaya on January 9, 1991. On 
August 15, 1991 the Court of Appeals upheld the Amended Order of 
the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Plaintiff's "Statement of Facts" (p. 4 through 11 of 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari), consists of approximately 40 
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paragraphs that, collectively, are somewhat true but are generally 
misleading and slanted according to Plaintiff's pro-se and non-
legal approach to his own case. Rather than challenge the truth 
and veracity of Plaintiff's representations of fact, Defendant 
elects to set forth her own version of the pertinent facts as 
follows. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced on September 8, 
1982 in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. (Decree, Record at 12-14). Plaintiff was ordered to pay 
child support in the amount of $250.00 per month for the parties' 
minor child until said child reached age 21. (Record at 13). 
3. Since the entry of the Decree, Defendant has brought 
numerous motions for orders to show cause against Plaintiff for 
child support arrearages, payment of medical expenses, for the 
timely payment of child support, etc..1 
November 17, 1982, judgment entered in the amount of 
$1,750.00. (Record at 24-25). 
February 7, 1984, judgment entered in the amount of 
$1,880.14. (Record at 53-55, 65-67) 
April 22, 1986, judgment entered in the amount of 
$5,471.00, combining all previous judgments. (Record at 95-99) 
October 27, 1988, judgment entered in the amount of 
$10,001.24. (Record at 173-177) 
July 13, 1990, judgment entered in the amount of 
$27,365.76 combining all previous judgments plus interest. (Record 
at 268-271) 
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4. On December 3, 1988, an evidentiary hearing was held 
before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Third District Court, on the 
issue of Plaintiff's contempt of court for failing to pay court 
ordered child support. 
5. On December 16, 1988, an Order was entered finding 
Plaintiff in contempt of court and sentencing Plaintiff to thirty 
(30) days in the Salt Lake County Jail. (Record at 188-193). 
6. On January 24, 1989, Plaintiff, having failed to purge 
the contempt, was ordered (in court) to surrender himself to the 
Salt Lake County Jail on January 27, 1989 for a period of thirty 
(30) days. (Record at 212). 
7. On January 27, 1989, Plaintiff failed to report at the 
jail as ordered and a bench warrant was issued against Plaintiff 
on February 6, 1989. (Record at 211). 
8. Plaintiff left the State of Utah for several months 
(Hearing Transcript, June 18, 1990, pp. 10-12, 15-21) and upon his 
return to Utah he was arrested and served his jail sentence during 
November, 1989. 
9. On February 21, 1990, Defendant filed a Verified Motion 
for Order to Show Cause, (Record at 213-215), requesting judgment 
for child support arrearages, for Plaintiff to be sentenced to jail 
for continued contempt and for Plaintiff's visitation with the 
parties' minor child to be suspended. On May 7, 1990, Defendant 
filed an Affidavit in Support of said Motion. (Record at 222-233). 
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10. On June 18, 1990, Defendant's Order to Show Cause was 
heard by Judge Sawaya. Plaintiff testified and Defendant's 
testimony was proffered by counsel. Based upon the evidence 
presented, Judge Sawaya found Plaintiff in continuing contempt of 
court and ordered Plaintiff to serve thirty (30) days in jail and 
suspended Plaintiff's visitation with the parties' minor child. 
(Record at 262). 
11. On July 13, 1990, an Order was entered against Plaintiff 
for child support arrearages2, for continued contempt of court, and 
suspending Plaintiff's visitation with the parties' minor child. 
(Record at 268-271). 
12. On July 16
 # 1990, Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of Bias 
or Prejudice (Record at 272-284) and on July 20, 1990 Plaintiff 
filed a Supplemental Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice (Record at 299-
304). 
13. On August 1# 1990, Judge Sawaya entered a Minute Entry 
stating "the Court having reviewed the Affidavit of Bias or 
Prejudice in the above entitled matter and questions its 
sufficiency and orders the same referred to Judge Murphy for his 
determination." (Record at 313). 
14. On August 1, 1990, Judge Michael R. Murphy entered an 
Order stating Plaintiff's Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice lacked 
2
 Judgment was entered for $27,365.76 (including interest and 
minimal attorney fees). 
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legal sufficiency and that Judge Sawaya would remain assigned to 
the case. (Record at 314-315). 
15. On August 13, 1990 Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal of 
the July 13, 1990 Order of Judge Sawaya and the August 7, 1990 
Order of Judge Murphy. (Record at 316). 
16. On October 10, 1990, the Court of Appeals vacated the 
portion of the July 13, 1990 Order denying Plaintiff contact with 
the parties' minor child and temporarily remanded to the district 
court for additional findings on the issue of the best interest of 
the child. The Court of Appeals retained jurisdiction to review 
any new orders. (Record at 332-333). 
17. On December 11, 1990, Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law were signed by Judge Sawaya pertaining to the July 13, 1990 
Order. 
18. On January 9, 1991 an Amended Order was entered by Judge 
Sawaya in accordance with the Findings and Conclusions of December 
11, 1990. 
19. Plaintiff appealed the Amended Order to the Court of 
Appeals. 
20. On August 14, 1991 the Court of Appeals heard oral 
argument pursuant to Rule 31 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
21. On August 15 1991 the Court of Appeals upheld the January 
9, 1991 Amended Order of the district court. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals properly considered the constitutionality 
of the trial court's order suspending Plaintiff's visitation. 
Judge Sawaya found that Plaintiff's non-payment of child 
support was willful and contumacious and that it was in the best 
interest of the minor child not to have visitation with Plaintiff. 
The district court did not err in conditioning the restoration 
of visitation rights upon compliance with support orders. 
U.C.A. §78-32-10 does not prevent the district court from 
restricting visitation privileges, if the court finds that the 
restriction is in the best interests of the child. 
An order to show cause proceeding is proper for the purpose 
of suspending and/or terminating Plaintiff's visitation. 
The district court can sign an order, even though objections 
have been filed, if the district court finds the objections have 
no merit. 
The Court of Appeals' use of Rule 31 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure was proper. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER 
SUSPENDING PLAINTIFF'S VISITATION. 
The Court of Appeals properly considered the Plaintiff's 
constitutional arguments with respect to the suspension of 
Plaintiff's visitation privileges. Plaintiff states in his 
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Petition (p. 11) that "there is a constitutional right of a parent 
to maintain a personal and close relationship with their [sic] 
children" and cites to several cases to support his position. 
(Interest of Walter B. . 577 P. 2d 119 (Utah 1978); Mever vs. 
Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, L.Ed. 1042 (1923); 
and In Re J.P. . 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982). All of these cases 
involve the termination of parental rights. Plaintiff's reliance 
on these cases is flawed for two reasons: first, the cases are 
limited in scope to permanent termination of parental rights while 
the case at hand is far more limited in that Judge Sawaya merely 
suspended Plaintiff's visitation until he exhibits behavior 
consistent with the best interests of his daughter and, second, 
Plaintiff's cases are cited out-of-context of the law governing 
suspension of visitation rights because there are numerous cases 
that empower a court to restrict or suspend visitation rights under 
certain fact situations. 
This case is not about permanently terminating Plaintiff's 
parental rights; it is about a parent's responsibility to help his 
ex-wife raise their child. Plaintiff may think that because his 
ex-wife has a home and employment — and because his daughter gets 
fed, clothed and cared for without him assisting — that this is 
just a case of legal semantics where he can play lawyer and spend 
countless hours trying to legally justify why he does not 
financially support his daughter. However, this is a case where, 
as Judge Sawaya found, Plaintiff's failure to pay child support is 
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willful and contumacious. It does not take a legal scholar to 
rightly conclude that a man who willfully refuses to support his 
child does not have her best interest at heart or in mind. 
Plaintiff argues that the Amended Order violates the Eighth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution as it constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment. There are several cases (infra) in which 
visitation has been suspended or conditioned. Plaintiff's only 
support for his argument that suspension of visitation amounts to 
cruel and unusual punishment is his own subjective belief that it 
does. 
The credibility of Plaintiff's argument, that the Amended 
Order destroys a loving relationship, is undermined by the fact 
that Plaintiff, of his own accord, willfully refuses to financially 
support his child and he physically had no contact with her, of his 
own choice, between February, 1989 until after November, 1989. 
(See Defendant's Statement of Fact #8). 
2. JUDGE SAWAYA FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF'S NON-PAYMENT 
OF CHILD SUPPORT WAS WILLFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS 
AND THAT IT WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE 
PARTIES' MINOR CHILD NOT TO HAVE VISITATION 
WITH PLAINTIFF. 
It should first be noted that Defendant's citation to the 
transcript of the August 14, 1991 hearing before the Court of 
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Appeals3 is improper because no such transcript was prepared by 
the Court of Appeals. Plaintiff's quote from hearing is taken out 
of context and should not be relied upon by this Court as it is a 
self-serving statement which has nothing to do with these 
proceedings. 
Plaintiff alleges that Judge Sawaya suspended his visitation 
for the sole reason that Plaintiff is willfully not paying his 
court-ordered child support. The Findings of Fact# Conclusions of 
Law and Amended Order clearly takes into consideration the best 
interest of the child as required under Rohr vs. Rohr. 709 P. 2d 382 
(Utah 1985).4 
The Lunsford, Slade. West, Soderburg, Smith, and Dana cases, 
cited by Plaintiff, are erroneously utilized by Plaintiff; the 
portions of those cases that he refers to are taken out of context. 
(Due to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 50(b) limitations, 
a detailed discussion of these cases is included in the Appendix 
hereto; these pages are copies from the Defendant's Court of 
Appeals Response Brief). 
"It should be noted at this point that respondent has 
admittedly abandoned the claim that the petitioner is unfit in 
anyway or degree except nonpayment of child support, (p. 23 lines 
14-21 of Transcript of Oral Argument of August 14, 1991)." 
[See Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari pg. 13]. 
4
 ... where the noncustodial parent's refusal to pay child 
support is contumacious, or willful and intentional, and not due 
to inability to pay, visitation rights may be reduced or denied, 
if the welfare of the child so requires. Rohr (p.383). 
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In the case at hand, The Plaintiff has failed to provide 
support for his daughter for several years except when faced with 
jail. The only actions which have prompted payments by Plaintiff 
have been jail sentences, yet after serving the first jail 
sentence, Plaintiff still made no child support payments until 
faced with a second jail sentence. In suspending Plaintiff's 
visitation for a period of time, Judge Sawaya is trying to help 
Plaintiff realize and understand that he (Plaintiff) has a 
responsibility to support his daughter. 
Therefore, the Amended Order did not suspend Plaintiff's 
visitation for the sole reason of non-payment of support. 
At this point, a review of Rohr is appropriate. The facts in 
Rohr and the facts in the present case are compared as follows: 
1. Amount of Father's Child-Support Arrearage. At the 
time the issue of suspending visitation came before the 
district court, the amount of the father's child-support 
delinquency was: 
a. In Rohr: $2,400. Id. at 383. 
b. In Coley: $27,305.00 (Amended Order). 
2. Number of Child-Support Judgments Against Father. 
At the time the issue of suspending visitation came 
before the district court, the court had entered 
judgments for child support against the father: 
a. In Rohr: Not apparent from case test. 
b. In Coley: 4 previous times. (Record at 223). 
11 
3. Conditions on Restoration of Visitation, At the 
time the issue of suspending visitation came before the 
district court, the district court conditioned 
restoration of visitation upon: 
a. In Rohr: Payment of all arrearages 
of alimony, child support, 
attorney's fees and costs, at which 
time the court would determine what 
visitation would be appropriate. 
Id. at 383. 
b. In Coley: Payment of $450 per month 
for 4 consecutive months (i.e. 
ongoing support of $250 per month 
and payment of $200 per month toward 
the arrearage judgment of $27,305.00 
which was accruing interest of 
$273.05 per month at the rate of 12% 
per annum post-judgment interest.) 
This Court then held that the following principles of law 
applied to the Rohr facts: 
1. "A court may not deny the noncustodial parent 
visitation rights for the mere failure to pay child 
support, where the failure to pay is due to an inability 
to pay.11 In the present case, Judge Sawaya found that 
Plaintiff had the ability to earn income (Findings of 
Fact #6 and Conclusions of Law Re: Amended Order on Order 
to Show Cause) and that Plaintiff's failure to pay was 
willful and contumacious (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law #1 Re: Amended Order on Order to Show 
Cause). 
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2. lf[W]here the noncustodial parent's refusal to pay 
child support is willful and intentional, and not due to 
inability to pay, visitation rights may be reduced or 
denied, if the welfare of the child so requires" and "the 
conduct of the father [sic] as it affects the child's 
welfare is a proper consideration of the trial court." 
In the present case, Judge Sawaya made the following 
findings with respect to the requirement "if the welfare 
of the child so requires" and as to "the conduct of the 
father as it affects the child's welfare": 
a. Plaintiff does not respect the legal 
system. (Findings of Fact #12). 
b. Plaintiff's attitudes and behaviors 
are anti-social and constitute a 
substantial deviation from the moral 
norms of society. (Findings of Fact 
#12). 
c. Plaintiff's behaviors and attitudes 
are not a proper example for his 
child. (Findings of Fact #12). 
d* Plaintiff lacks concern for the 
child's financial welfare. 
(Conclusions of Law). 
Plaintiff's visitation was suspended to impress upon 
Plaintiff a sense of responsibility for the welfare of his child, 
and the district court found that until Plaintiff felt such a 
responsibility it was not in the daughter's best interest to have 
visitation with Plaintiff. 
13 
3. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONDITIONING 
THE RESTORATION OF VISITATION RIGHTS UPON 
COMPLIANCE WITH SUPPORT ORDERS. 
The Plaintiff seems to argue that Rohr prohibited Judge Sawaya 
from conditioning the restoration of visitation rights upon payment 
of child support. (Petition for Writ, p. 16-17). 
The quotation that Plaintiff inserts from Rohr does not 
support his contention. The language Plaintiff quotes referred to 
the Rohr trial court requiring payment of all back alimony, child 
support, attorney's fees and costs before the trial court would 
consider a modification of the divorce decree. 
In the present case, the Amended Order does not in any way 
restrict Plaintiff from petitioning the trial court for a 
modification of the divorce decree and it does not require payment 
of all back child support, interest and attorney fees prior to 
restoration of visitation. The Amended Order provides Plaintiff 
with a means of restoring his visitation. Rohr did not prohibit 
Judge Sawaya from requiring Plaintiff to pay his ongoing child 
support of $250 per month and $200 per month toward the judgment 
of $27,305.00.5 The purpose of Judge Sawaya's ruling was to 
convert Plaintiff from a willful non-payer of support to a willful 
payer of support. The Judge's experience with Plaintiff — which 
is clear from the record — was that Plaintiff did not pay child 
support and his failure to pay was willful. When found in contempt 
5
 Post-judgment interest at 12% per annum was accruing on 
that judgment in the amount of approximately $273.05 per month. 
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of court in 1989 for not paying child support, Plaintiff still did 
not pay. The first time he paid any support, following the 1989 
hearings, was on the eve of going to jail. After serving the jail 
sentence, Plaintiff still did not pay until he was again brought 
before Judge Sawaya in 1990 and faced with the prospect of going 
to jail and losing his visitation. At that time, Plaintiff was 
again found in contempt of court and sentenced to jail, but Judge 
Sawaya gave Plaintiff two payment options: $50 a week to stay out 
of jail or $450 a month for four consecutive months to both stay 
out of jail and to have his visitation restored. Plaintiff has 
elected the first option and has ignored the second option. With 
respect to the first option, Plaintiff has seldom paid on a weekly 
basis. Judge Sawaya exercised proper judicial discretion in 
fashioning a contempt order designed to impress upon Plaintiff his 
responsibility to financially support his daughter, and an order 
that would allow him to get on with his visitation schedule in a 
matter of four short months. 
4. U.C.A §78-32-10 DOES NOT PREVENT THE DISTRICT 
COURT FROM RESTRICTING A PARENT'S VISITATION 
PRIVILEGES IF THE COURT FINDS THAT THE 
RESTRICTION IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD. 
Judge Sawaya found Plaintiff in contempt for failing to pay 
the court ordered child support and sentenced Plaintiff to thirty 
(30) days in the Salt Lake County Jail. That sentence was 
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suspended with the condition that Plaintiff make $50.00 per week 
installment payments. 
Plaintiff's visitation rights were also suspended because the 
trial court found it was not in the best interest of the child to 
have visitation with her father at this time. Plaintiff's 
visitation was also suspended based on the trial court believing, 
based on the history of the case, that it would take more than a 
jail sentence to bring home to Plaintiff a sense of responsibility 
for the welfare of his child. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals in Reardon vs. Reardon, 415 P.2d 
571, 574 (Ariz. App. 1966) stated: 
Support payments, however, are provided for 
the benefit of the minor children and when 
considering the history of the matter, the age 
of the children, the past conduct of the non-
custodial parent in exercising rights of 
visitation, and the possible ineffectiveness 
of the court contempt power, the trial court 
could properly find that the children will 
benefit by conditioning visitation privileges 
upon payment of support (emphasis added). 
In the case at hand, Plaintiff was sentenced to thirty (30) 
days in the Salt Lake County Jail in early 1989 and served that 
sentence in approximately November of 1989. Between that time 
(November, 1989) and the filing of Defendant's Order to Show Cause 
in April 1990, Plaintiff made no efforts to pay ongoing child 
support nor did he make any attempt to reduce the arrearages. 
Judge Sawaya knowing this, not only found Plaintiff in contempt 
again but, based on the history of the case and the nominal effect 
16 
the last jail term had on Plaintiff, also decided that further 
measures were needed to bring home to Plaintiff a sense of 
responsibility for his daughter's welfare. (See Reardon at 574). 
The Arizona Court in Reardon further stated: 
Nothing we say herein should be construed by 
parties litigant that they may assume the 
burden upon themselves of denying rights of 
visitation conditioned on payment of support 
monies without a court order. This is a power 
that the court only may have and it is basic 
that the parties themselves do not have the 
authority to so modify the orders of the 
court. (Id at 574). 
Trial courts have the authority to suspend visitation. In the case 
at hand, Judge Sawaya did not abuse any of the powers which have 
been vested in him by the State of Utah. Judge Sawaya was simply 
fashioning an order to try and bring home to Plaintiff a sense of 
responsibility for the welfare of his daughter — knowing that if 
he can convince Plaintiff that Plaintiff has that responsibility, 
and that if Plaintiff will perform that responsibility, the overall 
long-term relationship between that father and child will be 
enhanced and strengthened. 
5. AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE PROCEEDING IS PROPER FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF SUSPENDING AND/OR TERMINATING 
PLAINTIFF'S VISITATION. 
Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in "denying 
visitation" in the absence of a petition for modification. The 
trial court's power includes the power to suspend and/or terminate 
Plaintiff's visitation rights without modifying the divorce decree. 
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The trial court can impose restrictions upon existing rights if the 
trial court determines that such is necessary to compel a party's 
performance of an obligation. Plaintiff's reliance on Rohr is 
misplaced because, in that case, the wife petitioned to modify the 
decree permanently. In the present case, Defendant's Order to Show 
Cause was not intended to permanently deprive Plaintiff of 
visitation. The intention of the Order to Show Cause, and the 
resulting Amended Order, was to temporarily suspend Plaintiff's 
visitation in order to impress upon him his responsibility for his 
daughter's care, support and welfare, and the resulting Amended 
Order gave Plaintiff an avenue whereby he could quickly re-instate 
his decree-awarded visitation rights. 
6. THE DISTRICT COURT CAN SIGN AN ORDER EVEN 
THOUGH OBJECTIONS HAVE BEEN FILED IF THE 
DISTRICT COURT FINDS THE OBJECTIONS HAVE NO 
MERIT. 
Nothing in Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, which is cited in Plaintiff's Brief, indicates that 
even though objections to an order have been filed that the judge 
cannot go ahead and sign the order over the objections. The Rule 
only states that a party must file their objections within five (5) 
days after receiving the proposed order. Further, Plaintiff cites 
no evidence that Judge Sawaya failed to review Plaintiff's 
objections before signing the July 13, 1990 Order. Assuming that 
Plaintiff's objections were received by Judge Sawaya on July 11, 
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1990, as Plaintiff says, Judge Sawaya had three days, before he 
signed the July 13, 1990 Order, to review Plaintiff's objections. 
Plaintiff has failed to support his position that the trial 
court erred by signing the Order over his objections. 
7. THE COURT OF APPEALS USE OF RULE 31 OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE WAS PROPER. 
The Court of Appeals use of Rule 31 was proper in that the 
whole basis of Plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred was 
that its reliance upon Rohr was improper. The Court of Appeals 
found that the trial court abided by the guidelines set forth in 
Rohr and that a written decision on this matter would not add 
anything to the current law. 
If a decision truly adds nothing to the law, 
it should be disposed of from the bench or by 
a short written order that may be informative 
to the parties but to no one else. Paffel vs. 
Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 104 (Utah 1986). 
There was nothing improper in the use of Rule 31 by the Court 
of Appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has failed in his Petition to produce any authority 
for his positions. Therefore, this Court should deny certiorari 
in this matter. 
DATED this 1 day of October, 
Randall J. Holmgren I 
Attorney for Responden 
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and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondent in Opposition 
to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, postage prepaid, to the 
following, on Qr±. \\ . I^ qi 




In Lunsford vs. Waldrip, 493 P.2d 789 at 792 (Wash. App. 
1972), the Washington Court of Appeals stated: 
The paramount concern in such matters 
[suspending visitation] is the welfare of the 
child, and the conduct of the father as it 
affects the child's welfare is a proper 
consideration for the trial court. 
How can it be in the best interest of any child to be raised by a 
parent who refuses, unless faced with jail or suspension of 
visitation, to pay any support to help provide food, clothing, 
shelter, etc. for that child? In the present case, the district 
court found that Plaintiff was educated, healthy and able to 
provide the ordered support and that Plaintiff had not given the 
district court any reason whatsoever as to why Plaintiff had not 
paid the support as ordered. 
Slade vs. Slade. 594 P.2d 898 (Utah 1979), was an action by 
a father to establish visitation rights with his child who was born 
out of wedlock and the Utah Supreme Court found that "visitation 
is a matter addressed to the district court's sound discretion", 
fSlade at 901). 
In West vs. West, 487 P. 2d 96 (Or. App. 1971), the case 
involved an order by the trial court conditioning the father's 
visitation upon the father paying the court ordered child support. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals stated that "the right of visitation 
cannot be made dependent upon the payment of support for children 
....". However, the court upheld the trial court's order: 
[T]he order was set for the purpose of 
bringing home to the defendant a sense of 
responsibility for the child. (West at 98) 
Soderbura vs. Soderbura. 299 P.2d 479 (Idaho 1956), is a case 
where the father petitioned the trial court for a restraining order 
so that the children's mother could not transport the children out 
of the court's jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff's reliance on Smith vs. Smith. 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 
33 (Utah App. 1990) is inappropriate because the language quoted 
by Plaintiff refers to a situation where a party sought a change 
in custody because the other party had interfered with visitation 
rights. 
Plaintiff's reliance on Dana vs. Dana. 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 76 
(Utah App. 1990) is similarly mistaken because the visitation issue 
in that case focused on the mother's complaint that the father did 
not exercise visitation and she wanted him to be ordered to comply 
with the visitation schedule or be ordered to pay additional child 
support to offset her babysitting expenses. 
